At EU’s 2026 Africa FIMI Conference, Experts Spotlight Threats To Democracies

• Call for Collaboration To Counter FIMI, Strengthen Information Integrity

By Armsfree Ajanaku, Who was in Brussels, Belgium

The threats posed to democracies around the world by Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) drew the attention of African and European experts recently. Held on April 14 and 15, 2026, the Africa FIMI conference was organised by the European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS). The two-day conference, which was convened at the Comet Louise in Brussels had the objective of sharing experiences and expertise with respect to FIMI trends.  It brought together policy makers, journalists, researchers, think tanks and civil society organisations to explore insights and perspectives on FIMI trends on the African continent. Also in attendance were high level officials from the EU, including foreign ministries, diplomatic and embassy officials. Subject matter specialists from the European Commission were also available to share knowledge and expertise relating to key developments in terms of the threat levels and the evolving character of actors and the effectiveness of responses.

From the governance side, heads of government agencies and departments responsible for dealing with security threats occasioned by FIMI equally had the opportunity to reflect on the grotesque realities of information manipulation as well as the opportunities to collectively counter threats. From the various submissions, it was apparent that FIMI poses a lethal threat to democracies. There was therefore consensus that democracies in Africa, Europe and elsewhere around the world urgently need to work together to counter the sinister activities of threats actors. Specifically for Africa where democratic backsliding and reversals are becoming commonplace, the need to act fast was quite evident.

Some of the major discussion questions had to do with the nature of FIMI in Africa, the specific threat actors, the narratives being peddled as well as the techniques, tactic and procedures at play. The extent of the threats was aptly captured in the welcome remarks of the EEAS helmsmen and women. Firstly, FIMI and its toxic effects on democracies were described as shared challenges, which have contributed to the growing apathy and declining trust in democratic institutions. Given the scale of these attacks, key democratic governance outcomes, ranging from security to international partnerships could be completely undermined.

EU experts equally drew attention to the huge quantum of funds being poured into FIMI operations by threat actors, resulting in a period of serious escalation as would be gleaned from the upsurge in FIMI attacks year on year. According to the fourth EEAS FIMI report, between January and December 2025, 540 FIMI incidents were detected. The report attributes 29% of these incidents to Russia, while 6% of the incidents were attributed to China. 65% of the FIMI threats were not attributed to any actor. The report goes on to show that the opaque and shadowy character of many FIMI operations ensure “assets involved are deceptive by nature, hiding their operations and funding. As a result, identifying and investigating the behaviours and infrastructure behind unattributed FIMI assets is key to exposing the underlying threat.”

Consequently, leading democracies are worried about the large volumes of funding being deployed for FIMI campaigns by diverse threat actors. Top officials were clear about the fact that the EU as a bloc was being outspent by a long mile because the threat actors peddling FIMI in Africa and around the world were devoting enormous resources to achieve their objective of undermining democracies. Specifically in Africa, FIMI threat actors are spending a lot on information manipulation and various influence operations. Russia for instance reportedly spends between 2 billion to 3billion United States Dollars per year to carry out FIMI operations. On its part, China reportedly spends around 5 to 6billion USD on FIMI and interference. Experts pointed out that for the threat actors, this approach was a cheap way to undermine democratic societies, while muddying the waters to cause friction in the relationship between EU and Africa. Part of the tactics is that FIMI threat actors have studied the flaws, cracks and flanks of democratic societies. This understanding of the imperfections and contradictions within democracies, is then used as a basis to craft messages, which amplify narratives, that polarise and cause divisions in such societies.

There was therefore consensus that in this highly volatile FIMI context, democracies have to devote time and efforts to monitor the activities of threat actors. This is especially crucial given the roles played by Artificial Intelligence (AI). Threat actors are using AI to automate FIMI attacks. EU FIMI monitoring data shows for instance that in 2025, there was a 30% increase in AI-generated and disseminated content with narratives peddling FIMI. Experts have also sounded the alarms that there is the likelihood that AI-driven FIMI attacks will increase. Similarly, the other vector of FIMI escalation is in how threat actors are reportedly building the attack infrastructure inside countries by using existing organised crime and terror networks.

To respond to these hybrid threats, the EU particularly has conceptualised what it reckons as the most effective solution. This solution comes in the form of the Democracy Shield and sword strategy. The shield and the sword strategy entails going beyond the normal responses to FIMI, such as pre-bunking, debunking, fact-checking and Media and Information Literacy, EU is now set to utilise legal frameworks, sanctions, regulation and resilience building as part of the shield and sword approach. The sword part of the strategy involves using law enforcement capabilities within the EU to track and bring to justice agents of FIMI threat actors embedded in organised crime and terror networks. The shield part of the strategy focuses on building the resilience of European and African societies to enable them recognise and counter FIMI threats. Since it has been established that FIMI targets all democracies, the logic was apparent that disparate and isolated responses will hardly be effective in countering FIMI. The bloc has therefore recognised the urgent need for mechanisms that enable faster collective responses to FIMI in Europe and Africa. The calculation is that this approach will be implemented through partnerships, resource sharing and regular reporting of FIMI activities.

For the EU Democracy Shield therefore, partnerships between governments and civil society in EU and Africa are critical. The partnerships would have key elements like monitoring and data gathering on FIMI, support to independent media and civil society, especially on elections. With the nature of FIMI evolving beyond a fact-checking and media literacy problem, and with organised crime beginning to play a role, security agencies bodies like INTERPOL would have to be involved. However, analysts have warned that this approach also risks over-securitising the solutions to stopping FIMI. Experts believe the involvement of security now means covert operations would become normal in countering FIMI attacks. This has been identified as a problematic area. FIMI experts equally argue that potential use of covert operations is exactly what threat actors like China and Russia would love to happen because it changes the values calculus since both democratic Europe and the authoritarian regimes will now be resorting to the same Tactics, Techniques and Protocols (TTPs).

For several participants from Africa, the conference was an opportunity to interrogate FIMI frameworks, which originate from the European worldview. Part of the concern is that such frameworks may betray gaps, which make them inadequate to address the FIMI context in Africa. For instance, the FIMI context in Europe focuses majorly on online threats. Whereas in Africa, the challenge posed by a steep digital divide means offline counter FIMI strategies would have to be considered. There were also perspectives focusing on the vulnerabilities within African societies. African participants observed for instance that China and Russia are perceived to be better trusted partners in the African societies. This is largely due to the legacies of colonialism and slavery.

Across the two days of the conference, discussions also focused on the FIMI context in specific regions of Africa, including the state of play in West, Southern, East and Central Africa. African participants made presentations on key vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies. Best practices in project implementation aimed at countering disinformation, FIMI and hate speech, were shared. One such is the Social Media for Peace Project, implemented in South Africa and supported by UNESCO. The final panel discussion featured representatives of African governments. They provided overview of FIMI in their countries and how legal frameworks and policies were being used to address the situation.

However, the elephant in the room was clearly how to hold the big tech platforms accountable and get them to take steps to address disinformation spreading on their platforms. There was frustration that the European information spaces are currently facing a systemic decline in safety. As such, FIMI is not only undermining democratic legitimacy and institutional trust but is also imposing significant economic and health costs. The conclusion therefore was that despite legal frameworks like the Digital Services Act (DSA), the situation is remains quite challenging. In what has therefore been described as the “great retreat,” it was noted that, even in Europe, the world’s most powerful technology companies have backtracked on their previous commitments to combat disinformation. The result is that disinformation is easy to access on many platforms, while countermeasures are often inadequate. Although community notes were described as such countermeasures, they are largely ineffective in their current form. It was noted that the notes are often late, rarely become visible, and fail to address polarising. Info integrity experts therefore emphasised that human-centred verification remains a vital tool for mitigating the crisis of disinformation and FIMI. For countries like Nigeria holding general elections in 2027, the key takeaways from the 2026 Africa FIMI conference will prove pivotal to keep FIMI and its toxic effects on democracy in check.

Ajanaku is Executive Director, Grassroots Center for Rights & Civic Orientation (GRACO)