Countering FIMI: ACSS Strengthens Nigeria’s Defender Community Ahead of 2027 Polls
By Armsfree Ajanaku
As the countdown to Nigeria’s 2027 general elections intensifies, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) has begun convening media, civil society and academia for mutual reinforcing discussions about the integrity of the information space. The cardinal objective is to strengthen stakeholders’ capacity and collaboration to effectively counter threats posed by Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) before, during and after the elections. The crux of ACSS’s support was clear at the recent five-day virtual workshop organised to support journalists, fact checkers and civil society organisations on the frontlines of the fight against FIMI. ACSS, which previously supported Nigeria’s Defender Community as it worked to counter FIMI threats, is now exploring opportunities to build the Nigerian Defender Community’s resilience in readiness for the polls next year.
On Zoom recently, ACSS facilitated the sharing of deep insights about the FIMI trends, which the Defender Community will have to keep a close watch on. FIMI experts exchange ideas, and explored areas requiring joint action and collaboration, especially given the scale of the challenge. Accordingly, one recurring theme was the urgent need for collaboration, which will help stakeholders avoid the duplication of efforts. Given the challenge of scarce resources, it was apparent that working in silos would not bring about the desired results. The conversation similarly dwelt on the topic of what success and impact would look like if Nigeria’s Defender Community effectively counters FIMI threats. This would require an evidence-based and data-driven framework focusing on threat actors, the range of narratives they are peddling and how to address these in the face of the funding drought plaguing the development sector.
Ultimately, ACSS role has been to bring practitioners together and facilitate a process, which advances Nigerian-led FIMI detection and response. That process would also need to enhance defenders’ ability to identify, monitor, and analyse FIMI campaigns targeting Nigeria through practical methodologies. These objectives provided the justification for workshop participants to get immersed in the details of threat-actor trends, and diverse investigative tools. The workshop outcomes similarly strengthened collaboration and inter-African peer learning, while deepening connections among Nigerian counter-FIMI practitioners through shared problem-solving, methodological exchange, and cross-organizational learning.
The evidence suggests a clear and present danger of FIMI threats and the high possibility that malign actors will target Nigeria with waves of FIMI narratives, before, during and after the 2027 polls. The sinister objective is to undermine trust in elections and by extension, attempt to change the democratic governance model. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous democracy and it is seen as a keystone for West African security and regional leadership. For threat actors, upending or disrupting democratic rule in Nigeria will be a big prize for authoritarian sponsors of FIMI. The point was further stressed that Nigeria’s prominence has made it a high-priority target for state and non-state actors as well as militant Islamist groups seeking to foment internal divisions as a means to undermine democratic governance and gain greater influence.
The ACSS briefing further noted that in recent years, malign actors have increasingly used covert and deceptive means to manipulate narratives and exploit Nigeria’s ethnic and social fault lines for political gain. It said: “These actors are increasingly turning to AI-generated content, false attribution, platform manipulation (including via Telegram and TikTok), and coordinated campaigns that aim to discredit democratic institutions, glorify military rule, and inflame public debate—particularly ahead of Nigeria’s next presidential elections in 2027.” The first session of the workshop was a scene setter, which allowed Nigerian organisations working to counter FIMI to give the lay of the land in terms of what the current trends are.
Subsequently, session two of the workshop focused on China as a threat actor. It was noted that the Chinese uses a multifaceted approach for its influence operations, and this includes cultural, economic and trade strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative. It was shared that the Chinese interfere in countries through subtle ways, while also utilising their leverage in technology for the purpose of foreign influence. In terms of cultural influence, the role of the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria was spotlighted. Experts drew attention to the fact that the PRC has invested huge quantum of resources in the training of political actors and policymakers, making them susceptible to its influence. This point was buttressed with the recent cancellation of the RightsCon Conference, which was supposed to be held in Zambia. PRC was fingered to have pressured the Zambian authorities to cancel the largest gathering of digital rights activists from across the world. In the area of technology, attention focused on the fact that Chinese companies and citizens are required to “support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work.” As such, analysts fear data collected from Nigerians through various technology partnerships could be handed over to Chinese National Intelligence.
Up next was the conversation on Russian influence; the data shows their operations have scaled across Africa. In terms of tactics, Russian FIMI actors have shifted from covert campaigns to embedded local ecosystems. While Nigeria is not a primary target yet, there are fears it could become a strategic next frontier. The 2027 polls therefore present FIMI threat actors with a high-value opportunity window to unleash FIMI targeting Nigeria. Another observation was that under the Wagner Group era, Russian FIMI operations were more centralized and branded. However, with the death of Wagner boss, Prigozhin and the coming of the Africa Corps, Russian FIMI operations have tended to be decentralized, with locally embedded networks and more adaptability.
The most important point about understanding Russian FIMI in Africa however focuses on the fact that it takes advantage of existing challenges to democracies, including economic realities like the high poverty rate, escalating cost of living, insecurity and the lack of accountable governance. These problems within democracies are then amplified and used as basis to undermine trust in democratic processes and outcomes. Russian FIMI peddlers, are said to be particularly adept at spinning conspiracies about alleged Western backing for Jihadist groups waging the ongoing insurgency in the Sahel.
With respect to jihadist groups, their strategies and tactics for information manipulation, particularly in Northen Nigeria came out in bold relief. These groups include; the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram, the legacy terror franchise and Ansaru, which is an Al-Qaeda aligned, and resurgent since 2022. Ansaru’s online presence is said to be growing significantly. There is the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which is reportedly expanding influence in Northern Nigeria. Analysts point out that these groups have been publishing high-resolution ambush footage, prisoner executions, and territorial claims designed to intimidate and recruit new members.
These Jihadists similarly publish sermons and audio clips framing the conflict as a religious duty, while exploiting local grievances against the Nigerian State. Counter FIMI experts have also pinpointed trends of manipulated images, and fabricated atrocity reports attributed to security forces. As the preparations for the 2027 polls intensify, these groups will attempt to remind their online audience that democracy and elections are not acceptable and that only an Islamic theocracy in line with the Sharia would serve the people.
Countering FIMI experts therefore recommend that more attention should be focused on platforms like Telegram and other encrypted social media, where monitoring can happen in the local language. Counter FIMI defenders have also been urged to identify coordinated amplification clusters and bot-assisted behaviour patterns. There were similarly calls for coordination between social media platforms, governments, NGOs, and researchers for faster takedowns of FIMI. These approaches are urgently needed because the traditional methods security agencies deploy to address FIMI, such as issuing press releases do not work. Such outdated approaches are incapable of matching the scale of FIMI and the determination of the threat actors to reach vast audiences.
Another very insightful workshop session chronicled key FIMI lessons from elections in various African countries. The idea was to explore how other countries organised to defend against FIMI. With the benefit of this experience, Nigerian counter-FIMI defenders can pick up and implement useful and valuable lessons in readiness for the 2027 polls. The Election Integrity Task Force shared extensively about its work in Ivory Coast and Benin, while front line counter FIMI organisations like Debunk provided an overview of what working in Congo Democratic Republic looked like.
The workshop did not merely point to the threats; it similarly explored opportunities in terms of available African policy responses to FIMI. The Africa Charter on Human and Peoples Rights was on hand to share its responses to information integrity challenges on the African continent. As such, the final day responses, which focused on moving from analysis to action and also what would be required to build an agile defender community, capped off what was an intense and inspiring five days of learning and sharing. The next step is now for the defender community operationalise the repeated calls for collaboration, which was echoed throughout the workshop. This will be the basis to ensure a strengthened information environment during, before and after the 2027 general elections.
Armsfree Ajanaku is Executive Director, Grassroots Center for Rights & Civic Orientation (GRACO)